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CONFLICT AS A FUNCTION OF CHANGE

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TRADITIONAL thinking about relations between States, both in the academic and the political spheres, was characterized by acceptance of the following propositions:

- (i) Man is by nature aggressive;
- (ii) The quest for power is universal and a fundamental drive;
- (iii) States, being led by and comprising men, are aggressive and seek power;
- (iv) Some States are more aggressive and more inclined to seek power than others because of variations in human qualities and in social institutions and philosophies; and
- (v) Each State is in these circumstances obliged to organize its defences against the potential aggressive designs of others.

The system of power balances, and the system of collective security to which its failure gave rise, both rested upon these five propositions. They were designed to preserve existing power balances; any alterations that took place were those that these systems could not contain. Thus they were systems in which changed relationships could come about only by the exercise of force or the threat of force. These five propositions, and the threat systems they invited, rested upon the further proposition that objective conflict of "vital interests" between States could

be contained only within a mobilization system, and if not contained, could be resolved only by reference to the mobilization system.

Once these propositions were accepted, and formed the basis of State policy, a sequence of events occurred automatically:

- (i) Each State perceived the defence preparations of others as potential defence against change it sought, or as potential aggression in the pursuit of change it sought to avoid;
- (ii) No State enjoyed security, standing alone in conditions of greatly differentiated power, and each therefore tended to seek alliances;
- (iii) Even though these alliances were defensive and were deliberately designed merely to create power balances, they stimulated other alliances;
- (iv) Power balances evolved into attempts to secure favourable balances, and arms competition was established;
- (v) Breakdowns in the balance system because of the failure of other States to give pride of place in their policies to maintaining balances, because of attempts by dissatisfied powers to alter conditions, and also because of miscalculation of power balances, led to war;
- (vi) War settlements recognized the need for wider or even universal collective security;
- (vii) In practice the collective security instituted after wars was a favourable power balance under the cloak of international institutions, leading to subsequent challenges by dissatisfied powers.

There is evidence to suggest that this mobilization system, in which open conflict was the main means to change, was generally accepted as inevitable—if not desirable—at least until the weapons of open conflict were nuclear.

At this point intellectual confusion became widespread.

- (i) Breakdowns in collective security have traditionally led thinkers to advocate some form of world government with a monopoly of power, on the analogy of the internal development of the modern State;
- (ii) But such a world government would need to be preceded by, or accompanied by, disarmament and the creation of an international monopoly of force;
- (iii) However, disarmament is contrary to the above five propositions that originally persuaded States to adopt national defences and alliances;
- (iv) Hence the starting point would seem to be the elimination of States;
- (v) Apart from the fact that the world system is one of sovereign States, and that the basic problem is the defence of these, few governments or individuals are likely to favour a world imperialism or the substitution of a civil war for international war;
- (vi) The introduction of the nuclear weapon, it is argued, requires that the theoretically impossible be pursued as policy!

In the absence of any clear-cut alternative policy the political form of this confused thinking has been: let us seek arms control where possible, reduce political tensions where possible, make mutual deterrence more efficient, and meanwhile continue the art of diplomacy and hope for the best. Many academics, especially in the natural sciences, have given general support to this approach, while still insisting upon disarmament and collective security by direct negotiation. A response spreading among political scientists has been to re-examine the initial propositions on which these traditional policies have been based. The assumptions on which the power policies rest, such as expansionist tendencies, aggressiveness and certain concepts of national

interest, are being revealed as the probable outcome of these policies and not as fundamental conditions which justify them.

POWER AND OTHER VARIABLES

The assumption of inherent aggressiveness gives rise to the theory that power is the outstanding organizing factor of international society. Power theory has dominated thought over the centuries and policies have been based upon it. Yet aggressiveness may not be an appropriate behavioural concept to apply to States, especially within an international system that has conventionalized war as the main machinery and procedure for preserving or changing international structures. In this system "aggression", like war, can be "just".

The concept of "power", furthermore, is being analysed to reveal a host of different meanings, ranging from influence to coercion. Defined as influence, power is so all-pervasive that a theory of power politics is self-evident and adds nothing to our understanding: in all social relationships there is the factor of influence. More narrowly defined to mean coercion or effective persuasion (which is the more usual definition of power theorists), power, and the will to employ it, is one of many variables in international society. It is not clear that it is the most important.

The characteristic concentration of diplomatic history on the influence of aggressive personalities, on the employment of power, and on the expansionist tendencies of States, to the exclusion of the sociology and evolution of international society, has led to circular arguments in the explanation of international society. Aggressiveness has been assumed, and history has been searched for evidence of it; evidence of it has led to policies which have promoted it. Reformers have suggested disarmament and world government as a means of avoiding the consequences of aggressiveness without any evidence that it exists. Only now is the assumption being re-examined. What has appeared to be aggressiveness, and has led to policies of alliances, collective security, and proposals for disarmament and world government,

is now appearing as an integral and essential part of our world system. It is the means of change and resistance to change. Change is not made unnecessary by world government, nor has world government any means of providing for it except by ultimate resort to traditional means of conflict between those States that seek change and those that seek to prevent it. For this reason alone States will not accept world government, but if they did it would merely transform war into civil war. If the problem of change by peaceful means can be solved to the satisfaction of States, world government would become a possibility; but equally in such conditions it would not be required.

International society is increasingly pluralistic; there are many units, each with different roles and differently constituted. While this may not have been significant when international society comprised a small number of similarly located and constituted units, it is significant in a society of over one hundred States in which there are economic, cultural and political differences, and values attached to continued freedom from foreign intervention of all kinds. International society also exhibits an increasing interdependence of its units. The traditional jurisdictional, commercial and warfare relationships, which once were the main content of relations between States, are of decreasing importance compared with the increasing economic, political, ideological, racial, cultural, scientific and other common interests now reflected in the network of international functional institutions within and outside the United Nations. Power (coercion) is a variable that, over periods, stabilized or balanced pluralism and interdependence. But power—whether force or some form of compulsive influence—is now technically far greater, yet nevertheless less useful and influential. Whatever justification there was up to the twentieth century to treat this one variable as the only significant one, no such justification exists now. Pluralism and interdependence exercise an integrative influence in world society; even the imbalances and conflicts that arise out of pluralism and interdependence do not always lead to open warfare, because of

their integrative function. Hence, the reason for stability is not just "power" or power balances. Equally, despite attempts to achieve stability through power balances, the existing structure is constantly altering, indicating other influences at work.

Pluralism, interdependence and power are all affected by the development of the modern Welfare State. The modern Welfare State—whether communist or capitalist—is characterized by a high degree of democratization in decision-making which in turn derives from education, the mass media, communications, travel, welfare demands, egalitarian thinking and a host of twentieth-century influences which affect even the most powerful leadership. It is this factor of democratization which is ultimately responsible for the different developments of communism and socialism, for the capitalist Welfare State and for the granting of independence to former colonial peoples. It is this factor also which has led to international interdependence in health, agriculture, education and welfare generally in addition to traditional coexistence. Thirdly, it is this factor which has led to restraints on the threatened use and employment of power by States which previously relied upon power as the ultimate protection of their interests.

THE NORM

Thus the primarily integrating or organizing factor of international society would seem to be not power, but a more subtle complex of influences related to the growth of the modern State, that is, to processes of government within the modern State.

In more detail, that international society is as orderly as it is due, at least in part, to:

- (i) Relations based on bilateral and multilateral co-operation and reciprocity, including trade and commerce, joint use of resources and avenues of communication, and other relationships that have evolved on the basis of mutual agreements;

- (ii) Relations organized through international institutions, especially functional and regional institutions;
- (iii) The universal or regional acceptance of roles by States, even those carrying extensive authority, including leadership roles, and *ad hoc* roles such as peace-keeping;
- (iv) The exercise of State power in the preservation of territorial interests, the protection of boundaries, welfare and culture; and
- (v) The generalized observance of the conventions and rules of conduct which emerge in time out of conduct in respect of these four processes.

A system which derived its orderliness entirely from these five processes could be regarded as the "norm" for analytical purposes, even though the mobilization system might be the prevailing one. One of the major failings of international studies has been the lack of attention to the norms of behaviour, and generally to the sociological development of relations between States. It is as difficult to understand international society without any analytical model of "normal" behaviour as it would be to understand monopoly without a concept of pure competition, or ordinary human behaviour without a concept of "normal" behaviour.

The nature of international society, the role of power and other variables, the role of the State and the significance of nationalism, and possible developments in the future, can all best be examined by analysing the norms of behaviour of States and departures from them. The trial and error method of hitting upon likely causes of conflict and upon idealistic or possible solutions to problems, which has characterized political and academic thinking, has led to disastrous policies both in general and in particular situations. By basing analysis upon norms some of our most dearly loved hopes, such as world government, are destroyed, and positive values are given to institutions, such as the

State, that we have traditionally condemned as a cause of war. The "idealist" and "realist" approaches become mixed up in a way which makes chaos out of much of the existing literature, but it does lead to orderly analysis, to some general theories, and to policies that are not self-defeating.

RECIPROCITY, CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION

Social systems rest upon specialization of function, which in turn relates to resources and skills. Pure reciprocity occurs only at an early stage of social relationships, for once specialization advances on the basis of diversity of resources and skills, wants cannot always be satisfied by reciprocity: either supplier or consumer has an advantage, because of different values attached to what can be supplied and consumed. Exchange by reciprocity thus gives place to transactions in which there is credit or debit, and as this procedure continues, bargaining power accumulates, and supplier or consumer can ultimately employ power to his advantage.

The modern State system commenced as a series of relationships between units already characterized by very marked differentiations of power. There were large and small States. The already differentiated system has traditionally but mistakenly been the starting point of analysis; to commence at this point is to miss the significance of the mass of day-by-day transactions that are reciprocal, despite differentiated power. Indeed, despite increasing differentiation of power, both economic and military, the period since 1945 has been one of rapidly increasing reciprocity in functional arrangements and of increasing recognition of equality of status in non-political relationships, and even in some political relationships arising out of membership of the United Nations Assembly. In transactions in the private sectors of relations between States, and even in much of the public sectors, exchanges on a near-reciprocal basis are the rule rather than the exception. Yet the student of international relations is sometimes left with the impression that almost all commercial, cultural,

diplomatic and political exchanges are made within a power framework.

THE ROLES OF STATES

In a sociological perspective, States, despite the differentiation of power that has occurred, are not "powers"; they are systems enacting roles. Their independence and security relate to the manner in which they enact their roles, in respect of which there are certain rules dictated by experience and certain others which analysis and experiment advise as politically and strategically expedient.

By "role" is meant the expected behaviour of a State; the predictable behaviour to which adjustment has been made by others; the acts and functions of each State that, taken together, create the structure of international society. The roles of a State are determined in the main by the static elements of the environment in which it exists: location, resources, population, culture and traditional relationships. Amongst its roles are its production and supply of certain products, for example, rubber and tin from Malaysia. Britain has traditionally played a banking role as financial centre. The United States currently has an aid role. Sweden has a peace-keeping role.

Each of these international roles is finally determined by an interplay of foreign as well as domestic influences. But no State can for long enact a role which does not reflect domestic interests and traditions. One of the important sources of tension within alliances is an expectation of uncritical acceptance of leadership roles, expectations that nationalism and sovereign independence can readily be subordinated to some strategic planning. The conception of world government, in which each State hands over some part of its decision-making to a central authority possessing coercive powers, is one which is incompatible with the role of the State as domestically perceived and sociologically developed.

Whatever the roles that finally emerge out of structural and static factors, and from this interplay between domestic and

foreign influences, they are universally acceptable or unacceptable according to the ways in which they are enacted. If the government of Sweden took advantage of its peace-keeping function to promote trade interests its role would be unacceptable. The aid role of the United States is subject to the same considerations.

When States enact acceptable roles, differences in their size or economic power are of no account; units within international society may be regarded as equal. The role of a very small State supplying a high proportion of the world's needs in a particular commodity, the role of a neutral State in time of war, or the role of a small State as a mediator, cannot be valued. As in a factory or in a mechanism, each unit plays a role which may be as important as any other role. The leaders of the new States of Africa and Asia wish to be so regarded: this is the meaning of equality and their justification for the principle of one State, one vote in the General Assembly.

It is clear that role-playing carries with it certain powers. It would be a mistake, however, to lump together these powers with "power" as meant by power theorists. The power to which power theorists refer is that which is introduced by a State when it wishes to continue the enactment of an unacceptable role. When this happens, the egalitarian nature of international society is in some areas destroyed: tensions appear, and cumulative elements of power enter into relationships. "Aid with strings", the practice of discrimination in the role of an exporter or importer, or intervention in domestic affairs by means of a peace-keeping role, are examples of the employment of power and the destruction of equality in role-enactment. The power associated with acceptable role-enactment is better termed authority, for it is derived from and depends upon the acceptability of role-enactment.

No role remains acceptable permanently. It is not difficult to determine when a role is unacceptable; diplomatic and press reports will quickly indicate hostile responses. It is more difficult

to determine what constitutes unacceptability. Western aid has, in the opinion of some directly concerned, caused as much ill-will as good-will. From the point of view of the donor, it would seem better not to give aid on unacceptable conditions, and perhaps not to give it at all, if the response is hostile. However, States tend to continue practices, despite evident hostile responses, at least until these responses can satisfactorily be explained. There are important strategic motives behind United States aid programmes and United States active intervention in situations such as South Korea and South Vietnam; assistance or intervention in the form determined is apparently considered to be in the interests of the donor State. Those who have written about aid programmes generally agree that they are designed with the donor's interests in view. Yet there does seem to be some disappointment, perplexity and frustration experienced when aid and intervention are apparently not widely welcomed. Similarly, many British leaders find it difficult to understand why the colonial peoples and the world at large did not welcome the enactment of Britain's role as a metropolitan State prepared to spend large sums in administration and development of underdeveloped areas long after they had ceased to be useful markets and a source of revenue. Britain, unlike the United States, and probably because it lacked the power to continue it, was quicker to acknowledge that its role was unacceptable. It withdrew with the conviction that it was the colonies that were the losers. The same kind of incredulity and frustration is at present a feature of relations between the United States and France and between Western countries and the nonaligned States. The striking feature is that it is not the employment of force, the threatened use of power or the relatively strong bargaining positions of the Great Powers that creates tensions; it is the particular enactments by them of leadership roles that makes their aid unacceptable and which weakens alliances, despite a general acceptance of their leadership. Similarly, in the relations of the two thermo-nuclear States, tensions arise from unacceptable enactments of their

respective roles more than from their opposing ideologies or their nuclear strike-power.

Probably nothing more is being said here than that States accept the exercise of authority by other States, but not of power. Authority carries with it certain powers, but by definition they are being exercised legally, or in an acceptable context. Even so stated, however, an important aspect of international society is being underlined. The force-power-influence spectrum can be translated only into policies ranging from national defences, to alliances, to the balance of power, to collective security, to world government: at no point along this continuum can problems of peace and security be solved, for along it peace and security can be achieved only temporarily by preventing challenges to the *status quo*. This spectrum explains only some aspects of world society, and in particular those which are created by power policies. Authority is not found at any point along this spectrum, even though it may include force, for the power spectrum depicts unacceptable roles, while authority is limited to acceptable ones.

The power theorist could argue that a mobilization system includes the power of authority, and that we are disagreeing, therefore, only on a question of legitimacy. Morgenthau¹ makes reference to international aristocracy, which implies leadership roles. However, his test of legitimacy is a national one, "national interest" being the over-riding determinant of policy. In his terms the exercise of power in the achievement of goals will frequently be unacceptable to other States; by his own definition, power is the ability to ensure that other States adopt required policies. In the real world the test of legitimacy is acceptance by other States, and while power is not excluded, only that associated with authority is included in any concept of legitimacy.

Role-playing by States is a potential source of conflict because of the tendency of States to play their roles to the limits acceptable to international society. However, these limits define themselves, and the restraints are self-imposed. Role-enactment in the norm system is an extension of reciprocity and co-operation;

once the limits of agreed authority are exceeded, the player is unacceptable. Indeed, even the original role may then be rejected, as in the case of the total rejection of all aid if some is offered on unacceptable conditions. The restraints on the player of a role are his threatened unacceptability, and therefore the withdrawal of the opportunity to enact a role.

THE PRESERVATION OF TERRITORIAL INTERESTS

The most frequent, and from the point of view of international law, the most important occasion for the exercise of power is in the protection of territoriality. A function of the State is to protect its boundaries, its resources, its people and their culture. This is basically the function of protecting society against undesired change, especially change initiated from outside. A stable international society in which each unit is in a condition of peace with all other units becomes unstable or potentially unstable immediately any change occurs, at least until adjustments are made. Each State faces options of accepting change and adjusting itself or endeavouring to force the burden of adjustment on others. Faced by an altered market position, a State may transfer labour out of an industry, or give protection to labour in that industry. In this sense power is the ability of a State not to have to adjust to change; it is the ability to force adjustment on others. Conflict is not resolved by this exercise of power; a new international structure is created which may require the continued support of power. The roles of exporter and importer become altered, and probably altered in ways unacceptable to some units within the system. Usually retaliation and cumulative self-enforcing trends become established, leading to escalation of conflict and to cumulations of adjustments required in the structure of international society. Ultimately these invite drastic changes in structure by drastic means, this being the alternative to a smooth flow of change and adjustment.

Protection of an industry is an obvious example; ideologies, political institutions and cultures no less require protection

against the demands made by change, especially once they no longer command respect. The more protected, the less adjusted they become, and this is a source of ideological conflict and false imagery even between communities having basically common values and goals.

How great a source of conflict is this exercise of territorial power? As in the case of role-enactment, territorial protection is not always a serious source of conflict because of the same kind of self-policing influences; the same restraints that govern reciprocity and role-enactment generally govern a State's bilateral relationships: any State which arbitrarily alters its trading policies, acts discriminatorily, or acts in ways likely to lessen confidence in its administration, does so at certain cost, in terms of relationships of value to it. International functional institutions seem to be able to help in conventionalizing practice in some of this area. Protection of ideologies and cultures still seems to be central to problems of peaceful relations; but this may in due course be seen as protection of institutions and interests of one kind and another, and not necessarily related to national interests.

THE CONVENTIONALIZATION OF BEHAVIOUR

These behavioural norms have been conventionalized, and are reflected in international customary law. Conventionalization of behaviour is itself a factor contributing to orderly behaviour: etiquette is likely to be observed because it is conventionalized, and some international behaviour patterns are of this order. It should be noted, however, that the laying down of rules outside norms is unlikely to promote observation of them: one of the problems of international law, as will be suggested below, is that a small group of older States has developed norms of behaviour that are not regarded as appropriate by other groups in the expanded world society of the post-war period. They are not norms in the sense in which we have used the concept, and conflict situations have arisen out of attempts by European States to have them observed as though they were.

UNACCEPTABLE EMPLOYMENT OF POWER

We now pass from the norm of behaviour to the real world. It is the exercise of power outside these two areas of role-enactment and acceptable territorial defence that is a major, if not the sole, source of serious international conflict. As in the case of role-enactment, territorial protection can be a source of conflict once the accepted limits of power are exceeded or if power is exercised in an unacceptable manner. Steps taken by a State deliberately to alter the role-enactment of others—for example, embargoes on certain products for political purposes, discriminatory treatment of imports, or the employment of economic bargaining power for political ends—all have a motivation and content not directly related to territoriality, even though the policies are applied within the boundaries of the State concerned. They are a source of conflict. For this reason, GATT makes a distinction between policies adopted for pressing domestic purposes, and policies of discrimination on political grounds, and it endeavours to exercise restraints on the latter. More dangerous examples are intervention in the political affairs of other States, threat systems that cannot be interpreted as territorial defence systems, assertion of economic, strategic and political rights not directly associated with territorial defence, and some forms of propaganda. It may be an acceptable exercise of authority when a State protects some immediate national interest; but to apply power—even bargaining power—to another State as a means of preventing change or avoiding adjustment to it is unacceptable, for this is a direct interference with the role of another State.

The employment of power unrelated to or outside accepted roles and territorial protection is the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, it is this use of power with which history has been primarily concerned and which is constantly in the minds of formal decision-makers; it is the justification of defence policies and for alliances.

Quantity and quality are, however, interrelated: some of the greatest deficiencies in contemporary analysis of world society

arise out of the failure to examine the degree to which the norms of sociological processes have rendered unnecessary or unusable the military, political and economic power of States, especially in the period since 1945. Of the one hundred and thirty States that comprise world society, each one with a complex relationship with all others, few have power that can be exercised outside territoriality. Of those that have such power, the Soviet Union in its relations with its allies has experienced, and to a significant degree adjusted to, the resistances created by unacceptable employment of power. Britain and the United States have no less acknowledged the limits of power in their alliances and in their dealings with Africa and Asia. Furthermore, alterations have taken place in the political environment which have led to political restraints on great States. Traditional international law, arising out of traditional practice, seems to have given to powerful States some special rights in other States; the right to protect foreign bases, resources or lines of communication—a right relevant only to great States—has been claimed and upheld. But with the establishment of new States and the democratization of foreign policy-making the great States are operating in a climate in which special rights are no longer universally acknowledged in law and no longer so readily enforceable by them. One international lawyer, Wolfgang Friedmann, has argued in his *The Changing Structure of International Law*² that the principle of “unjust enrichment” frequently gives no cause in law for the protection of foreign interests; and the principle of national sovereignty stands opposed to the intervention by one State in the internal affairs of another, *even though invited so to do* by the government of that State. (“... the parties in a civil strife seriously contesting the control of the country, must probably be taken as equals”). This is based on the principle that “any attempt by a foreign Power to interfere with internal change, either by assisting rebels to overthrow the legitimate government, or by helping the incumbent government to suppress a revolution, is contrary to international law”.) It would seem that these two traditionally

accepted rights for powerful States to employ power outside the immediate requirements of territoriality are now being withdrawn, as a result of the altered nature of the political environment.

The power theorist and “realist” will disagree with this on the grounds that each State is obliged to pursue its national interests to the limits of its abilities, including the employment of whatever power seems necessary. Some would argue that a State has a moral duty so to do, and that in any event it will do so, and will certainly not limit its activities to acceptable roles. This argument confuses available power with usable power. In practice, Great Powers are restricted in the employment of their power to their leadership roles; they are most cautious in going beyond this, and do so only when pressing circumstances lead them to risk hostile responses. Nuclear power is available but not usable in situations of great importance—Suez, Cuba, Vietnam. Economic bargaining power is available but not always usable in aid programmes—India’s refusal of wheat from the United States; Egypt’s responses to the threats of Mr. Dulles. It is this which is significant in the twentieth century: in the pluralist, interrelated international society, power is restrained by factors other than power. The pursuit of national interest is no longer a function only of power.

National interests have been classified, and national interest defined, in many ways. It is the outcome of a process of interaction between roles within the State and roles of other States. When its protection or promotion requires action by the State within the limits of the authority of the State, no conflict arises; when the State employs power or the threatened use of power, then there develop resistance and a conflict situation. What the realists have failed to perceive is that national interests are closely related to universal interests. States, even thermo-nuclear States, cannot continuously exceed the limits of their authority without destroying consensual support and weakening their own alliances.

Thus we have a description of world society which suggests that there are integrating factors other than power, including the conventionalizing of reciprocal and co-operative relations, international role-playing by universal institutions with the consent of member States, international role-playing by States, together with the authority that role-enactment implies, and national action in the protection of territorial interests. There is also a fifth factor, the employment of power for purposes unrelated to these four, in ways interpreted by other States as "aggressive", ways which exceed the immediate requirements of national sovereignty and territoriality.

The power theorist seems to imply that this fifth factor is effectively the controlling one, and policies have in the past assumed this to be so—and in doing so may have tended to make it so. Whatever was the position in past ages, the twentieth century world is not organized primarily by this fifth factor. Power operates in one form or another in each of the other four processes, but it is power associated with roles and authority and sovereign rights and not power in the sense of coercion. The power approach is one which concentrates attention upon clashes of interest, and in which international society is seen as being in a constant state of disequilibrium except in so far as power balances can maintain an equilibrium. By paying attention to norms of behaviour as a first approximation, instead of assuming the existence of a mobilization system, attention is directed away from power and aggression to change and the desire either to prevent it in order to preserve an interest, or to force it in order to promote one. Aggressiveness and the attainment of power are seen to arise out of complex interactions such as frustration, a sense of injustice, resistance to domination by others, confrontation with intolerable options, fear of loss of property and other such elements. These interactions arise in some cases out of false perception and false information, but induce aggressive responses nevertheless.

Once attention is focused on change and the need for adjustment to it, some sufficient reasons for the self-defeating aspects of defence systems are apparent. Power balancing, alliances and collective security are all devices for use by States with an interest in preventing change and in resisting the inconveniences or losses of adjustment. At the same time, some light is thrown upon aggressiveness: it is the behaviour of those States that are not satisfied with the existing international structure, and who, in the absence of any effective means of peaceful change, set out to challenge the power of those that are. Attention to change reveals the stark inconsistency between traditional thinking and policy on the one hand, and the dynamic situations with which diplomacy is in fact dealing, on the other.

DECISION-MAKING

The management of and adjustment to change is the function of the State. Whereas the mobilization model presupposes that the nature of conflict is a clash between those wishing to maintain existing structures and those wishing to alter them, and suggests the need for international institutions designed to regulate the ensuing power struggle, the norm model draws attention to the sovereign State as the principal actor in conflict resolution. The decision-making process thus becomes the focus of analytical attention.

In this context, nationalism and sovereignty are not institutions to be deplored; on the contrary, since the international system is comprised of sovereign independent units, a high degree of nationalism provides the motivations needed to maintain the independence of the units and to curb the exercise of State power outside accepted roles.

It is also clearer that "decision-makers" in the international area are not men or States, or groups of State agencies; these are merely the *formal* or constitutional decision-makers. For purposes of analysis of international relations, the decision-maker is a

process; it is the final outcome of interaction between a host of domestic influences and interaction between these and foreign influences, all in the environment of the State and of the international structure. The behaviour of particular leaders is part of a process, their decisions being a reflection of past policies and future expectations. The impressive aspect of relations since 1945 is the manner in which these relatively static factors, and the ways in which these interacting processes, have controlled formal decision-makers in the exercise of power both outside and within their generally accepted international roles and territorial rights.

Our attention is now focused on the State rather than upon international institutions that might be expected to control the State. The problems of world order relate to the ability of States, especially the most powerful, to adjust to change by means that are acceptable and to avoid the apparent need to force adjustment upon others, or to prevent change by others taking place. The abilities of the United States and the Soviet Union to accept political developments in other States not in accord with their political philosophies, and the abilities of affluent States to adjust to the demands of developing States, are internal abilities. When they are lacking, steps tend to be taken to intervene in the affairs of others. Power, in these terms, is the ability of States to prevent change elsewhere or to force the burden of adjustment on to others; it is employed in respect of economic, political and strategic change, by means ranging from tariffs to influencing political developments in other States to the installation of strategic bases.

The power model can readily be adapted to draw attention to the behaviour of States; indeed, it is essentially a model based on the State, any international aspect being introduced only by reason of alliances and collective security that follow the failure of State power to ensure security. In 1961 Modelski³ attempted to systematize the power approach. He defined power as "the community's present means to obtain the future desirable be-

haviour of other States". When referring to the community's means, he is concerned with community power available for use by governments. "Power is the produce of co-operation between the policy-makers and their community." For Modelski, power-inputs and power-outputs are the variable elements of foreign policy. The foreign policy operations of a State are limited by the amount of power at its disposal, and a picture of the foreign-policy operations of a State can be inferred from an account of its power-output. His diagrammatic representation is:




This model at least points to decision-making as a central feature for study, even though it tells us little about it.

The above analysis of the organizing forces of international society suggests that we require a model that explains non-power as well as power relationships, and one which tells us more of the nature of decision-making both at government and at a community level. Furthermore, the input in which we are most interested is change; power enters into the model only in so far as it is a means of preventing change, of enforcing adjustments internally or externally, and generally in giving effect to some types of decisions. As such it may at times be all-important, but its function in relation to change is the aspect of analytical interest.

The following change-input model, like Modelski's, is not intended to prove anything; but it does demonstrate some aspects of international society and its processes not otherwise apparent.

DECISION-MAKING MODEL



* Operative when authority exceeded; indicative of conflict situation; includes foreign assistance and alliances.

↓ Input
↑ Feed-back

Variations required: Many change actors operating simultaneously;
New change factors occurring before decisions taken on those already perceived;
State interactions and bargaining in respect of unassociated inputs;
Separate policy-making model to show testing, feed-back and goal changing, consequent upon above variations.

This model draws attention to a number of features that are of interest and thus helps to define the area of study. These include:

- (i) Factors relevant to the perception of change by the community: whether the change in fact took place (the missile-gap), whether it was designed to injure (trade embargo) or was a normal environmental change (reduced consumption of an imported product), different interpretations of change according to the ideology of the country of origin, the manner in which change is reported by the mass media, and so on;
- (ii) Factors relevant to classification and memory of the community: past experiences, including experience of conflict, aggressiveness, traditional and stereotyped thinking;
- (iii) Types of response by the community determined by perception and memory: the influence of leadership, educational levels, and knowledge of the environment;
- (iv) The detailed processes by which formal decision-makers perceive, classify and respond: the interrelations between government and community, feed-back from domestic and foreign sources on policies contemplated or being implemented, both directly and through the domestic and foreign enforcement agencies of the State;
- (v) The nature of both domestic and foreign executives: police, diplomacy and the armed forces, and alliances;
- (vi) The nature of organized pressure groups seeking to promote or to prevent change: and the nature of national and international pressure groups, and the interplay between the two directly and through governments and international institutions; and

- (vii) The general nature of domestic and international consensus: how it develops, becomes codified and policed.

In addition to defining the fields of interest, a change/decision-making model underlines some of the features of the decision-making process:

- (i) While the formal or constitutional decision-maker is a head of State or a government and its agencies, in reality the decision-maker is not a man or a group of men, but a process; final responses may have no relationship to the responses, in similar situations, of individuals or small groups;
- (ii) The crucial decisions affecting foreign policy are those in which decisions are required as to whether change and adjustment are to be accepted or resisted, and the consequent decisions as to whether they are to be enforced upon domestic or foreign interests;
- (iii) Revolution is a situation in which domestic enforcement is inadequate—that is, one in which the power of authority must be supplemented; and international conflict is one in which foreign enforcement requires more than the powers associated with territoriality—that is, one in which it is required to apply power directly to other States;
- (iv) These decisions will be affected not only by the availability and willingness to employ power, but also by the level of efficiency of the State and its ability to adjust to change; a State with unemployment and no re-training programmes, greatly dependent on a few exports and a few markets, has a low capability for adjustment. Its power can be employed to compensate for this;

- (v) Inefficiencies in decision-making, such as faulty perception and information, ideological or other commitments that prevent assimilation of new facts, barriers to feed-back, all threaten the change-adjustment process and invite the employment of power;
- (vi) Restraints on States operate from within and, by reason of international consensus, at all levels of community and governmental perception, decision-making and execution; and
- (vii) Consensus plays an important role: if domestic and foreign consensus are common, goal-changing is likely (Suez?); if they conflict, a conflict situation is likely (South Africa?).

This is a decision-making model of one State; the output of one State is the input of other States, and there is an international society of over one hundred States. Comparative studies are relevant but a first step is to examine the basic processes of a State. The interrelationships of inputs are important because they remind us that international relations are not zero-sum: the output of aid by a donor State may bring favourable or unfavourable responses from the recipient, but whatever the response, it becomes the input of many other interested States and will be of greater magnitude than a bilateral relationship would suggest. Equally, the output of a Great Power which interferes in the domestic affairs of other States is far greater than is measured in bilateral terms.

COMMUNICATION AND REALITY

Decision-making models appear to give additional insights into problems of change and conflict. They explain international relations by reference to other factors in addition to power. Have we created a model which—while more comprehensive—distorts the picture of international relations? Power has traditionally

been held to be so important an organizing factor that other features deserved only passing mention. Writers tend to write about what they believe is reality, or what in their view should be. The charge of unreality is usually made by the "realists" against "idealists", and indeed the realist school was a reaction against the Wilsonian idealism of the 'twenties. Yet it is the realists who are now most conspicuously building up an unreal picture. Morgenthau's plea is for a return to traditional power diplomacy: what in effect he is saying is that peace would be more secure if power politics prevailed and not that power politics does prevail. He is the idealist! He regrets the passing of traditional power diplomacy and holds as responsible for our problems the democratization of decision-making, open diplomacy, the absence of the will to play according to the rules of power politics, and other such features of the real world.

The power theorist would argue that the norm model merely points to the breakdowns in the power system—Munich settlements, giving up colonies—and that these do not demonstrate any modification of the nature of power politics; the breakdowns occur merely through temporary lack of the will to employ available power. Power theorists are describing what they would like to see; they are trying to point to ways in which the power system can work more reliably and guarantee peace and security. Morgenthau's "morality" is the full employment of power in the pursuit of national interests, in the context of a world environment in which there prevails power diplomacy among an international aristocracy that knows the power rules. But will—or the absence of it—is determined by the complex of factors operating within the decision-making process of the modern State. It reflects values, domestic and international. To bemoan the absence of will, or to advocate the re-introduction of will to employ power, is merely to bemoan the passing of an age, and the coming of another. It is saying what ought to be; political scientists are concerned with what is.

The real position seems to be that there are formal decision-makers in some States engaged in diplomatic and bargaining techniques and pursuing policies of power politics within a world system in which the processes are based on communication and steering. They are pursuing policies and tactics irrelevant to the times and the general political environment. The approach by power techniques to a problem of relationship which can be solved by processes outside the power framework creates conflict situations, thus seeming to justify these techniques. Cuba was such a situation: continued trade and relations with the United States, and even deliberate assistance to the new government, might have produced a political system with which the United States could work; the power approach helped to create the situation it sought to prevent.

Technological influences, particularly relating to communications and weapons, together with education and the course of development of the modern State, are creating conditions in which power politics is less and less acceptable, and less and less relevant to the circumstances. That it is still practised is not evidence that the world system is one based on power; it is evidence, first, that some theorists and practitioners think it is, or think it should be, and second, that some States have deficient decision-making processes.

EFFICIENCY IN DECISION-MAKING

This brings us finally to a conclusion about policy which is grounded in administration and decision-making. The traditional approach to international relations, which rests upon history and analysis of contemporary situations, has its administrative counterpart in the structure of foreign and defence offices. In a foreign office, input concerning a particular situation is fed into regional divisions where there are specialists in certain areas and countries who endeavour to integrate and to interpret new information. The detailed information that is compiled is fed to more senior officials with wider responsibilities who seek to sift out the more

significant facts. The end of this process is a submission to a political decision-maker which is intended to be brief and to the point. At each successive level of the decision-making hierarchy, details are sifted out. Defence procedures are similar, and equally aim to produce a boiled-down appreciation of a situation.

Even thus treated, total input is likely to overload decision-making, and the formal decision-maker is likely in these circumstances to adopt the most clear-cut policy. In 1965, President Johnson, already confronted with day-by-day—and night-by-night—problems in respect of Vietnam and problems in respect of negroes, was suddenly faced with problems in respect to Latin America, including the safety of United States citizens. An understandable response was to employ available forces, at least to hold the situation. Once such a tentative step has been taken, others, not necessarily intended, follow automatically. With more time for thought, with a different sifting of information, different recommendations might have been made and different decisions taken.

Here is a hypothetical, but plausible, case of a breakdown in decision-making. It traces back to a fault in administration, and this in turn can be traced to a misconception about the study of international relations.

Clearly there is a need for the regional "expert" with a full knowledge of local features of a situation. But the official who is sifting the facts requires a different training: he need not have knowledge of the facts, but he does need to be in a position to ask the appropriate questions of those that do. An arbitrary sifting of what appear to be relevant facts usually draws attention to personality and ideological features, the aspects that press reporters might find news-worthy. A sifting on the basis of a framework or theory would call attention to a different set of features. It would warn against decisions to employ power in the suppression of indigenous uprisings and at the same time point to other means of achieving stated policy goals, and even to alterations in these goals. It would protect decision-makers against

stereotypes, and against hasty conclusions based on preconceived ideological notions.

Here we face a serious practical problem of administration. Even a foreign office as old and experienced as that of the United Kingdom contains no senior official who would be aware of contemporary systems analysis, who would have a theoretical framework in which to operate, other than a traditional and rather crude version of power, power balances, power vacuums and zero-sum conceptions of international relations. Knowledge of languages, a great deal of specialized local knowledge and "experience" in handling diplomatic relations is widely possessed. The only qualification apparently required to be a sifter of facts is the additional qualifications of seniority. There are gatherers of information (juniors), and sifters and co-ordinators (seniors). To insert a line of trained sifters is virtually impossible because in a hierarchical structure in which co-ordination and sifting were treated as superior functions, there would be organized resistance. The specialized sifter would have to serve his time as a regional specialist, and first of all have to acquire language and other qualifications to be admitted to the structure at this level. By the time he became a sifter he would be out of touch with theoretical thinking. It took time for graduates to be accepted into public services; it will take time for specialist graduates to be accepted. What is required is an understanding of the interplay in decision-making of inductive and deductive approaches. The regional specialists are required in large numbers at junior and senior levels, and they are the central pool from which the foreign service is staffed. But the specialists in analysis are also required at junior and senior levels, though in smaller numbers, and they constitute the continuity of central administration and provide special missions in relation to analyses of current situations. The training required is different—the one person cannot be up-to-date as an international relations specialist and also as an international affairs specialist. Neither is "superior" to the other; each requires the other.

CONCLUSIONS

- (i) Power—the ability to influence others to act as required—is not necessarily the essential or the main factor in the organization of world society.
- (ii) The nature of Man, and the aggressiveness of States, are not important origins of conflict.
- (iii) Power is employed, and men and States appear to be aggressive, when there are no peaceful means of altering or defending existing relationships between States, and therefore change and resistance to change is the important origin of conflict.
- (iv) Sovereignty and nationalism may, in the absence of means of peaceful change, appear as manifestations of the will to power and of aggressiveness; nonetheless, they provide the motivations on which world society is built and appear equally as manifestations of the will toward development and world order.
- (v) World government with centralized enforcement power is an unrealistic notion, for it assumes the repression of nationalism and sovereignty; it is a destructive notion because it seeks to destroy motivations that are sociologically basic; and it is a false notion because it purports to suppress power and aggressiveness while not solving problems of change and adjustment.
- (vi) No world institution which is based on representatives of States can avoid majority and minority groupings, and world organization is therefore a system of power balances in disguise.
- (vii) The world system is one based on sovereign States and will continue to be, thus providing, on a basis of decentralization, opportunities for functional co-ordination and co-operation; (a rider is that disarmament will occur only when arms become irrelevant to international society).

- (viii) What we seek are the principles of policy that each State is required to follow in order to live in a condition of peace with all other States.
- (ix) International relations is essentially the study of the decision-making processes of States and the consequences of failings in these processes.
- (x) States, under pressures of technology, security and independence, are groping towards nonalignment and co-existence and appropriate principles of policy are emerging, such as political non-discrimination, non-intervention, defence within territorial limits, and sovereign equality, which are promoting international institutions free of enforcement capabilities.
- (xi) The efficiency—in a policy-achievement rather than in a mechanical sense—of the decision-making process of each State is the vital point in the chain of events that determines peace or conflict.
- (xii) The allocation of resources that today will give the greatest national pay-off is one which encourages frontiersmen in international relations in their thinking, which encourages academics generally to translate theory into teaching texts, which by recruitment and training creates an efficient formal decision-making apparatus, and which by education at all levels including the adult level transforms academic knowledge into conventional wisdom.

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