

## THE ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

The settlement of conflict by peaceful means has been a traditional objective of State diplomacy. It received added stimulus with the evolution of international institutions: while States, having drifted into conflict, are inhibited by prestige, pressure-group interests and other political factors from taking initiatives in the resolution of their own conflicts, and in accepting the mediation of others, sometimes they find acceptable the initiative of an international collective-security organization. The League of Nations Covenant set out principles and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in particular arbitration, judicial settlement and enquiry by the Council. The United Nations Charter included more detailed and far-reaching procedures, especially under its heading 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes'. In general these require parties to settle their differences by any peaceful means they choose; but there is a threat in the background- the Security Council has the power to recommend a settlement in the absence of agreement amongst the parties. As most conflicts can be argued to threaten the peace, procedures that are usually relevant are 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression', and under this heading the powers of the Security Council include preventive and enforcement action against a State.

It will be noted that 'peaceful' or 'pacific' settlement of disputes within this institutional framework means settlement without violence; settlement without violence ranges from negotiated agreement between parties, to a determination imposed upon them by others. In all cases the settlement is dictated by the nature of international society: within a political framework settlement of conflict is by bargaining and compromises determined by, amongst other factors, the relative power of the parties and their allies. Sometimes settlement takes place only after the test of relative power in warfare. Even mediation and conciliation by one State in the disputes of others is of this nature: threats, bargaining and the pressures of the international system are in the background. Hence, though the traditional concept of 'peaceful' may mean without violence, it is used only in the non-war sense; the violence of the parties is merely suppressed by the coercion of others. Settlements arrived at within a political framework result, therefore, in a non-war condition of potential instability. - A shift in power relations is likely to lead to re-emergence of the conflict. In this sense World War II was a continuation of World War I, and World War III could occur as the outcome of post-war settlements imposed within a framework of unresolved conflicts.

In the same way, the settlement of political disputes by judicial procedures, also provided for both by the Covenant and the Charter, are possible and effective only by reason of the political framework in which they are constructed. Judicial settlements are not based upon an understanding and acceptance by the parties of the different values involved. International courts are inevitably political bodies; but this factor aside, while courts may sometimes take into consideration sociological factors, precedence and convention are stronger influences, and these reflect past political structures and the existing framework of international society. Judicial settlements of political disputes are political determinations in disguise; they are settlements produced within and by the political system. As most political disputes arise out of attempts to alter the political system, to challenge its values and practices, one of the parties to a judicial settlement is likely to be left with a sense of frustration or injustice, which in due course stimulates in it further attempts to alter the system. In practice States do not submit to international judicial procedures - even though there can be no enforcement of decisions - for fear of the political consequences of unacceptable decisions that do not take fully into account their interests and values.

That States do not submit to 'peaceful' or judicial means of settlement of disputes is commonly regarded as a matter of great regret; there is today a widespread hope that the 'rule of law' will extend to more and more States as traditional (Western?) values and respect for law extend to new and less experienced States. Brierly has observed, 'No lawyer is likely to doubt the desirability of a much greater readiness on the part of States than they at present show to accept the settlement of their disputes on the basis of law. The present unlimited freedom of States to reject that method of settlement is entirely indefensible; it makes possible the grossest injustices, and it is a standing danger to the people of the world by encouraging the habit of States to regard themselves each as a law unto itself.'<sup>(1)</sup> This is a view-point relevant to the power system of thought: in a behavioural system the desirability of acceptance of judicial settlements of disputes is far from clear. The probability is high of the grossest injustices from legal determinations in international politics. Power influences, the problems of investigation of the basic causes of conflicts and of the values involved, the tendencies for legal procedures to support existing structures against change, and the difficulties in arriving at judicial settlements in respect of racial, religious and cultural conflicts, are so much more important in the settlement of international disputes than of disputes that occur within States, that the desirability of the rule of law is not established.

It follows that the legal view that all disputes are justiciable, that is within the competence of law, is a misleading and dangerous one. Brierly argues 'International law then is never formally or intrinsically incapable of giving a decision, on the basis

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(1) J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, (Oxford), 6th Edition, 1963, p.368.

of law, as to the rights of the parties to any dispute'.<sup>(2)</sup> This legal approach to the settlement of disputes, however relevant it was within a power framework, is incompatible with contemporary knowledge of conflict and its resolution (as distinct from settlement). It is based on the assumption that judicial settlements can bring stability, an assumption which in turn relates to the proposition that justice promotes stability, and the notion that law reflects justice.

In fact, disputes between States are not 'justiciable', not merely because States refuse to submit politically important disputes to courts, but because judicial settlement, like other forms of settlement, does not lead to the resolution of conflict; and it is the resolution of conflict that is important to States and to peaceful relations between States. In short, international lawyers have been advocating procedures which cannot, and in the interests of peaceful relations, should not prevail. Resolution of conflict - as distinct from settlement - is not possible either by power bargaining, or by judicial processes. Frequently resolution of conflict requires radical changes in concepts of justice, and in traditional practices, which have been defended by powerful States and written into customary law. Resolution of conflict cannot take place within a political framework, and those idealists who have advocated so-called 'peaceful' or 'pacific' and judicial settlements have been advocating something that is both unrealistic, and undesirable from the point of view of establishing stable peaceful relations.<sup>(3)</sup>

#### The Resolution of Conflict

A conflict is resolved, as distinct from settled, when the outcome is self-supporting, and for this to happen the new relationship must be freely negotiated and wholly acceptable to the parties involved. Because the word 'peaceful' has unfortunately been pre-empted, to mean 'without violence', 'self-determined' will be used to describe such settlements. The Covenant and the Charter both encouraged self-determined settlements, and they take place in the normal course of relations between States as when compensation is offered by a State for some damage done to the property of another, and when a border dispute is settled by procedures agreed between the parties. But once there is serious political tension, parties are rarely able to resolve their conflict unaided.

The Covenant and the Charter both jump from self-determined settlement - which is rarely possible - to settlement suggested by a mediator, determined by an international court, or ordered by an international enforcement organization that operates within a power framework. This jump from unassisted voluntary settlement to settlement by compromise within a political framework, misses procedures which in the resolution of social conflict are proving to be the most important.

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(2) Ibid, p. 367.

(3) See E.E. Harris, Annihilation and Utopia, (Allen & Unwin), 1966, for a carefully drawn criticism of the nature and role of 'law' in international relations. (Continued overleaf).

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- (3) (contd.) Brierly is not representative of contemporary international lawyers, but he reflects the legal approach generally to international relations. W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, (Stevens), 1964, agrees (p. 94) that, 'There is a burning and vital need for the establishment of effective international military force, as provided for in the hitherto abortive provisions of the U.N. Charter, a force that will be able to enforce the authority of the international community against all States, big and small. There is a need for the extension of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and for enforcement powers that will make the defiance of its judgments, as exemplified in the very first case decided by the new Court, the Corfu Channel case of 1948, impossible'. True he, more than many others, wishes to place the emphasis, not on coercion, but upon a sense of obligation, 'The general legal philosophy underlying this approach is that obedience to law does not necessarily rest upon either command or the threat of sanction but on the acceptance of a norm as binding.' (p. 85). This admission of the ineffectiveness of enforcement, and the acknowledgment of the need for voluntary acceptance of norms, still carries the implication that determinations by law lead to justice and acceptable resolution of conflict. This may be so in cases of little political content, and in cases similar to those customarily dealt with in civil courts, but in respect of political disputes there is insufficient empirical evidence that this is so, and a good deal of sociological theory and empirical evidence to suggest it is not so.

The study of the nature of international conflict, and in particular of techniques of resolving it, have not been a matter of interest to traditional scholars, nor to those engaged in international institutions. Both the Covenant and the Charter dwelt upon economic and social conditions that lead to international conflict, and established research and functional machinery for removing them. To this end the Economic and Social Council has initiated a wide network of agencies. It is significant that the Security Council has no research agencies or functional institutions concerned with the nature of conflict and means of resolving it.

It is not surprising that this is so. First, any suggestions for the self-determination of serious conflict were unrealistic in a world society organized largely by the relative power position of the main units within it. There is an inevitability of trends towards power relationships once a differentiation of power has occurred, and there is also the inevitability of reactions against the enactment of unacceptable roles, thus constituting a situation of potential conflict. At the same time there are adaptive or behavioural processes of political systems to be taken into account; the possibilities of altering goals and directions of policy once decision-making processes are efficient in terms of perception, assimilation of data, response and feed-back from the environment. To the extent that world society is power-motivated and organized, the resolution of conflict is unrealistic because it is irrelevant; to the extent that world society is participation-motivated and its member units are capable of internal adjustment and altered responses, the resolution of conflict is a politically relevant objective.

The second reason for the absence of any interest in the resolution of international conflict is that within States, because judicial procedures and enforcement prevail, the study of conflict has not seemed relevant. It is only in recent years that attention has been given to forms of conflict which are not readily resolved by judicial means, for example, racial, family, small group and industrial conflicts. Because these require resolution rather than settlement, the nature of conflict itself, and the techniques of resolution have had to be studied. Even today sociological investigation of conflict is in its infancy, and techniques of handling disputes are only beginning to be developed and employed commercially and officially. We now know that there can be resolution of conflict (as distinct from settlement) only by the parties to it. Asian leaders have claimed that there can only be Asian solutions to Asian problems - the more generalised proposition is now an accepted part of psychiatric thinking.

Assuming that relations between States are participation-motivated, (that power is an instrument and not an end), and that political systems are adaptive, and that for these two reasons the resolution of conflict is a practical objective, then the search is for means. It is the sociology of conflict and the handling of disputes

within a State outside judicial processes that can throw light upon international conflict; it is the solving of the conflict problem, rather than the determination and enforcement of a settlement, that is what is sought both in these social conflicts and in international relations. Furthermore, sociological conflict is relevant to international relations apart from the fact that neither can be resolved by judicial and enforcement processes: there is frequently a causal connection between sociological conflicts and international conflict, as for example, when communal conflicts spill over into international relations.

#### The Re-establishment of Communications

It needs to be stressed that what is sought is the resolution of conflict, even conflict that has already reached the stage of violence. 'Peaceful' settlement, in its pre-empted use, refers to conflict that has not yet led to violence: self-determined resolution of conflict applies to any dispute or conflict, no matter what stage it is in.

If the resolution of conflict, as distinct from a settlement that might be agreed as a result of bargaining and enforcement, cannot rest upon outside determination, and must come from the parties by processes that alter their perceptions and understanding of the view-points of each other, then the re-establishment of communication is a basic pre-condition. If one assumes that conflicts are due to aggressive or expansionist tendencies of States and that power relations determine the nature and structure of international society, conflict settlement can take the form only of third-party intervention, the determination and enforcement of a settlement, or the military defence of one party by the other. This is the assumption behind United States intervention in Vietnam: the aim is to weaken opposition and give what power support is necessary to whatever government is finally established in South Vietnam. This is a logical extension of the process of power politics by which a State endeavours to impose its will on others by negotiating a peace-settlement after defeat, or in circumstances that acknowledge defeat. On this assumption, communication is not part of the process of ending the conflict, (except to see whether one party is ready to agree to terms) at least until one side is victorious. But if one assumes that conflicts between States are based upon demands for and resistance to participation in decision-making, then it follows that participation demands must be met. In the first case, the peace-settlement is dependent upon one side being in a position to impose its will - there is no settlement except an ending of the overt conflict. In the other case, resolution is based on acceptance of norms of behaviour, and can be negotiated even during fighting. The two different forms of conflict resolution may be described by reference to different means of handling industrial conflict. On the one hand there is the refusal to negotiate until one side returns to work (or lifts the lock-out), the settlement being reached only after defeat by one party.

On the other there is negotiation while strike (or lock-out) continues, agreement being the basis on which the dispute is resolved. In the first instance there tends to be no communication until one side surrenders, and in the other there is communication even during conflict, leading to agreement. In practice, conflict-resolution must be based upon agreement prior to cessation of conflict; otherwise there occurs a case of post-war peace settlement after one party is defeated. The first step in conflict resolution is, therefore, to re-establish communication where it has broken down. The means of communication can be direct or through third parties; but whatever the means, the communication must be that of the parties, and not of the third parties.

The re-establishment of communications presents problems of its own. Initiatives by one party are inhibited by fear that they will be perceived as a confession of weakness or of defeat. If known they might lessen resolve of those engaged in conflict. Furthermore, a willingness to negotiate implies a willingness to compromise, and leaders of parties to a dispute are rarely in a position to demonstrate such a willingness. There are procedural means of meeting some of these difficulties, including third party initiatives and informal and secret communications between the parties. Discussion between academics closely associated with governments in conflict is sometimes possible, and effective; situations can be explored as an academic exercise, with no commitment, and in an atmosphere in which academic reputation is more important than political stances. If any area of agreement is discovered this can be explored formally, if not, no damage is done. It is noteworthy that even States in conflict maintain some communication - the United States and China, Malaysia and Indonesia. The problem is not to re-establish communication so much as to control it once re-established.

#### The Analysis of Conflict

Communication between parties by itself does not solve conflicts: on the contrary, it was communication that made the conflict possible, and frequently re-established communication merely increases conflict. The form of the communication, and the behaviour of the parties during communication determines the outcome of relations.

A third party is required for this purpose. However, what is required is not the third party traditionally agreed between the disputants, or a mediator appointed by an international institution. The resolution of conflict depends upon its accurate analysis, and while this can be made only by the parties, they can make it only with whatever insights might be available about the behaviour of States and the sociology of conflict. The function of the third party is to supply this, and for this reason this party must be a panel of specialists informed on the dispute itself, theories concerning the behaviour of States, and the various aspects of conflict.

The procedures to be adopted, as determined by the conditions, seem to be those of the clinical psycho-analyst or the caseworker. The analysis (or panel of political scientists) could trace the history of the dispute, themselves point out what appear to be the relevant stages of escalation, and try to expose its nature and to suggest solutions. But this is essentially the traditional and historical approach, and the prejudices and theories of the analysts would determine their observations. The procedure required is for the parties themselves to determine what is relevant: the selection of relevant events from the detailed history must be made by the parties themselves. They are stimulated to select from the history of the dispute by the observations of the opposing parties, and by the comments and questions of the analysts, who are guided by general and partial theories of conflict.

The analyst and the social caseworker are concerned with problems faced by the individual, and attempts to assist an inadequate person dealing with a too-oppressive environment. Action to alter the environment, and to help the client adjust to it, are both relevant. The client is most usually maladjusted in some way. It might seem a far call from casework to resolution of conflict between States. States are not maladjusted individuals, and the representatives of States are almost always intelligent, aware and highly informed persons. Furthermore, casework is not dealing with conflict between parties; in so far as it is concerned with conflict it is concerned with conflict between the individual and his environment. Yet, the experience of casework is relevant. It has something to contribute in methods and techniques which could cut shorter the experimental stages of resolution of international conflict.

Analysis of conflict reasonably commences with a survey of conflict with a view to diagnostic typologies. The problems of the social worker have to be faced by the international analyst: 'how to set up categories that will assist the user in synthesizing his thinking rather than stratifying or dichotomizing it; how to create typologies that will truly illuminate and not be used as 'magic formulae' or as 'gadgets'; how to construct typologies that will assist rather than inhibit the social worker in participating with the client in the creative and dynamic interaction that is the heart of social work process; how to learn to use typologies in ways that still permit individualisation of person and problem'.<sup>(4)</sup>

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(4) Loda G. Selby, 'Typologies for Caseworkers', *The Social Service Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, 1958, and reprinted in Eileen Younghusband, (ed.), *New Developments in Casework*, (Allen & Unwin), 1966.

The 'supportive' approach of the casework is most relevant: caseworkers have had to face the problems involved when identification with a party is essential, when approval is necessary of actions within the context of their enactment, while still maintaining the objectivity that is needed in order to ask the appropriate question or make the leading comment. The social and international analysts require many of the same techniques: '(1) the techniques used for lessening tension in the interviewee; (2) techniques used for bringing or keeping the interviewee to the main issue; (3) techniques used for helping the interviewee to make difficult admissions; (4) techniques used for breaking defence mechanisms; (5) techniques used for influencing the judgment of the interviewee; (6) techniques used to help the interviewer to gain time; (7) techniques used to help the interviewer recover from a bad start',<sup>(5)</sup> Clarifications, the promotion of insights into the position of each party by the other, correction of perceptions, communication of international processes of inter-action, require techniques and skills that are common-sense, yet still require experience, and moreover, an appropriate temperament and training. Laying down 'the law', giving advice, asserting what policies should be, is as inappropriate in international conflict resolution as in casework, and it is the same techniques and insights that are required to avoid these mistakes in both cases. Psycho-analysis, psycho-therapy, group therapy and resolution of conflict between parties to disputes all have much in common; they all involve professional relationships, and invite the same kinds of professional behavioural patterns.

Social workers emphasize roles and identity problems,<sup>(6)</sup> and it is clear that these are important in relations between States. One of the important background features of Indonesian-Malaysian relations has been the altered roles of each State, and difficulties of identification each has in relation to the Malaya-Philippine - Indonesia region. The 'doing, thinking, feeling, interacting' features of casework have their equivalents in State behaviour.

As with caseworkers, so with international analysts, they must explain fully their own interests, motivations, and the theories or hypotheses they wish to test or to employ. Indeed, it is even more important in relation to States: the resolution of conflict will frequently depend upon an understanding and even an acceptance of some theories, for it is on the basis of theory that perception of the other party and of the conflict depends. Willingness to participate is basic to all analytical work; in international conflict there are clearly stages at which no co-operation is possible. What these stages are is not clear, but willingness probably relates to processes and techniques of analysis, and here again casework experience is relevant.

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(5) Margaret Brown, 'A Review of Casework Methods', New Developments in Casework, *ibid.*  
(6) See Helen Pearlman, 'The Role Concept and Social Casework', and 'Identity Problems, Role and Casework Treatment', published first in The Social Service Review, Vols. XXXV, No. 4, and XXXVII, No. 3, and reprinted in New Developments in Casework, *ibid.*

A special problem that the international analyst faces is the transfer involved from the representatives of parties to disputes - who are persons - to decision-makers - who are political institutions. Experience is that representatives of parties are inclined to enter into discussions, to be caught up in the framework, as though they were acting within a functional arrangement. A degree of loyalty and a desire for discussions to produce a positive result emerges. Alterations in perceptions and attitudes are likely to take place, but none of this is constructive unless the transference takes place to decision-making levels.

Three factors are important in this connection. First is the experience and training of the persons that represent the disputing parties. In one sense they must deliberately play a professional role no less than the analyst: while becoming involved and receptive, they must, nevertheless, remain objective and interpret the views of their government. The analyst needs to encourage this, despite a natural desire to alter the attitudes of the persons concerned: his clients are not those persons, but the parties they represent. Second, it is important that representatives report to their governments with discretion, omitting much exploratory discussion and odd suggestions, but reporting firm and politically relevant progress, fresh perspectives and new information. Third, the transference can finally be made only when discussion points to a basis of agreement. In other words, representatives do not convey their workings in the margin and the attitudes stimulated by the process; these are merely means to an end. They convey the final results, and if politically realistic these can be acceptable without any transference of the atmosphere and theoretical analysis necessary to the resolution of the conflict. In some cases, quite clearly, steps might need to be taken to effect an actual transference, for example, by undergoing the same processes of discussion at higher political levels after some tentative conclusions have been reached at representative levels.

#### The Techniques of Conflict Resolution

This approach to the analysis of conflict has research aspects that at this stage of our knowledge are more important than any likely practical achievements. It helps overcome several methodological difficulties. First, work on international conflict has been largely confined to philosophical and sociological thinking based upon observation of conflict within and between small groups. Except as analogy, small-group conflicts may have little bearing upon international conflict: it may be that concepts of aggressiveness, leadership and power drives, and traditional perceptions of inter-State relations, are misleading. Involvement with parties to disputes enables the behaviour of States to be studied directly. Second, testing of theories of international conflict has been by historic analysis. The value of historical analyses of conflict, even when the techniques of detailed

content analysis are employed, is limited because the historical data available were selected and recorded on the basis of the then contemporary theories and perceptions; the data relevant to theories that are now to be tested are not usually available, and the available data cannot be re-examined for accuracy in the light of new theories and perceptions. This is especially so in the field of decision-making to which theory is now paying attention. By making an analysis of a contemporary international situation, it is possible to alter theories, to seek different data, and to check data in a continuing process; the method encourages the investigator to be flexible in his perception of the conflict, and discourages the giving of attention only to those aspects which seem to support a particular theory. Third, the analysis of any political system or sub-system can best be accomplished by observing it in action in its environment, that is, by observing its responses to the environment, and its altered responses after feed-back from the environment; a behavioural study requires a live situation.

In 1965 in London, after a review had been made of contemporary literature relating to the analysis of conflict, a pilot study was initiated. Three governments involved in a conflict were invited to send representatives to meet with a panel of political and social scientists. It was explained to them that the immediate purpose of the exercise was to assist scholars in their studies, and that any pay-off to the parties would be incidental. The three responded, and discussions took place during one week, followed by regular meetings. The scholars agreed that from their various view-points - social psychology, industrial relations, economics, international law, international politics - there is a great deal to learn from this kind of exercise. Much was learnt about the minor details of techniques of investigation, such as the handling of discussions, the need for sensitivity in pressing answers relevant from a theoretical view-point but regarded as irrelevant by the parties, the time between meetings needed by representatives of governments for consultation, the need to avoid any drafting at early stages, the means of maintaining an exploratory and non-negotiating attitude, and so on. More importantly it was possible to formulate hypotheses to be tested by the same techniques.

This pilot study concerned a special type of conflict that did not significantly involve boundaries or major differences in objective interests. Insights into the nature of international conflict, and techniques of resolution, will be obtained only by examining numbers of different types of conflict, involving ideologies, race, territory, strategic interests, and other features of conflict. In practice there could be advantages in making an analysis of several conflicts simultaneously. This technique has been likened to psycho-analysis; there may be pay-offs from group therapy. The communal problems of Indians and Fijians in Fiji, of the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia, and of the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus, have features in common, and discussions between them could be instructive.

Broadly, the academic framework of this first study was:

- (a) the stating of the general theory and partial theories on which the perception of the investigator is based, which are responsible for his evaluation of significant facts, events and responses, and on which he interprets the environment;
- (b) the setting down, as a first approximation and subject to revision as investigation proceeds, what appear to be the persistent features of the political environment of the political system being examined;
- (c) the examination of the systems and sub-systems that are relevant to these persistent features, and the introduction of whatever empirical research, partial theories and insights that might appear to be relevant to each of them;
- (d) the examination of the perceptions made by the parties in these political systems of each other, and comparison of these with the perceptions made by the investigator on the basis of his stated general theory;
- (e) an endeavour to explain and to interpret, and to state choices open to the parties, and to predict their consequences; and
- (f) the observation of events relevant to explanations and predictions that are made, and the assessment by the parties of the value of the analysis provided.

These procedures involve every aspect of International Relations theory:

(a) involves general and partial theories, (b) geopolitics, strategic and economic factors, (c) systems analysis and sociological investigation, (d) psychological factors and decision-making processes, and (e) and (f) diplomatic practice, techniques of investigation and testing, and international institutions. Any intelligent person could evolve for himself such common-sense procedures. This is, of course, the position in any scientific enquiry: procedure seems obvious once it is systematised; but the relevantly trained scientist can employ it to best effect.

In more procedural detail the steps were:

- a. To obtain in turn from each party to the dispute, his perception of it.

This procedure has the overt purpose of informing the panel of the details of the dispute; it has, however, the effect of informing each of the parties of the perceptions of the others, and doing this within an academic framework conducive to objective and frank description. Questions and answers further clarify and bring to light features that have been over-looked or glossed over, and which, sociologically if not politically, appear to be important. A broad notion of theory of the dispute then emerges and is enunciated.

- b. To compare perceived images, and also to compare these with the postulated theory of State behaviour, and to find explanations of discrepancies by reference to experiences, such as fear of hostile acts, which conditioned perception.

It is at this stage academics can make a contribution, by reason of their own theoretical insights, by asking significant questions, by presenting mirror-images, by inducing role-reversal, and generally by enabling the parties to perceive each other more objectively.

- c. To obtain from each party a list of assurances, actions or policies it requires of the others, and of other States not directly involved, and of the actions it itself would be willing to take on a unilateral or reciprocal basis.

Academics can by this means make a pattern of the seemingly acceptable demands, pin-point demands that seem important to one party while seemingly not acceptable to others, and direct further attention to these, checking on perceptions which led to them, evaluating costs of making these demands against costs of failure to settle the conflict, and considering compromise or other means of achieving the objectives to which the demands are related.

- d. To reconsider the schedule of demands, test them against theory to ensure that they do not just provide the basis of a political settlement without really getting to the root of the problem, insert other demands as might seem necessary, and re-submit to the parties.

The main area relevant in this connection is internal political conflicts that parties are reluctant to tackle: for example, the treatment of minorities, and propaganda directed at internal unity at the expense of external relations.

- e. To extend the discussions to include other parties that exercise an influence on the situation, to test their responses to demands made on them, and to ascertain the demands they would make.
- f. To re-submit the wide pattern of demands to the parties directly concerned, and to continue this process until the demand schedule is acceptable.

While analysis of conflict by field work and by participation in the resolution of conflict overcomes some important methodological difficulties that have prevented a breakthrough in the study of International Relations, it is not without its own problems. Subjectivity and the personality of the investigator, make analysis more complicated by this method than by traditional ones. Furthermore, goals of analysis sometimes have to be subordinate to the goals of conflict-resolution; for purposes of analysis, the investigator needs to be objective, and to probe areas on which parties are sensitive, while his success in the resolution of the particular conflict depends greatly upon his ability to identify with the parties to the dispute, to see the situation from their points of view, and to win their confidence.

In addition, in a behavioural study, the scholar is dealing with changing relationships; the position as perceived today alters tomorrow. Furthermore, in a limited, and sometimes in a significant way, investigation itself alters a situation. The mere asking of questions, the bringing to light of previously unrecognized or hidden facts, tend to initiate actions, and to lead to policy decisions. If academic investigation of any conflict-situation is thorough, the situation being investigated will for this reason alter.

There is another practical difficulty that occurs whenever testing involves the investigator in participation in the political system: there are subtle influences that affect perception and interpretation once the two roles are played at once, especially if the investigator is a national of a State within the political system under study. This is a constant problem for the scientifically-minded practitioner and for the academic adviser.

There is also a problem once the investigator is involved in the practice of diplomacy, or in assisting parties in the resolution of conflict, and this is the problem of secrecy. There is one form of secrecy-behaviour more irritating than that of the official who employs the secrecy-mystique to enhance his social status and to hide his ignorance, and this is the calculated reticence of the academic who has temporarily been admitted to the fringes of decision-making. Academic thinking must be open, free and subject to scrutiny. Yet, involvement in conflict-resolution, even as an investigator, imposes a need for discretion, without which the situation may become more complicated, and the testing of theory and techniques itself may be prejudiced. There is a challenge here to academic integrity and maturity; the existence of this problem does not justify a refusal by scholars to interest themselves in the analysis and investigation of contemporary political situations.

It is too early to make any claims about the usefulness of discussions between parties and analysts, except in so far as it is possible to draw conclusions from a pilot study, and by analogy, from experience in the resolution of small-group conflict. Further research is necessary, and in this there are opportunities for close co-operation between scholars and practitioners on a basis which fully accommodates the immediate interests of both.

#### Other Approaches

Two other methods of analysis of conflict are simulation and content analysis. Both are tools that can be helpful to analysts in preparation and during discussions. In practice, the analysis of conflict by controlled discussion between parties is an extension of simulation: the parties are not negotiating, but they are exploring and testing reactions and to this extent simulating negotiation. Simulation exercises are an essential part of the experience of analysts, as are role-reversal

exercises. Content analysis is also relevant. Osgood has described content analysis as 'attempts to infer the characteristics and intentions of sources from inspection of the messages they produce'. The outstanding, recent example of this is the content analysis of documents relating to the 1914 crisis that has been carried out by North, Holst and Brody of Stanford. There are certain methodological difficulties about this technique, which the authors acknowledge, and there do seem to be some philosophical problems, including some of those to which reference has been made above in relation to historic approaches. Nevertheless, and subject to an awareness of the limitations, and to checking conclusions against conclusions arrived at by other methods, content analysis is capable of leading to valuable insights into political behaviour. Co-operation between scholars engaged in research into conflict by various techniques, and between them and practitioners, is as yet under-developed.

#### The Institutionalisation of Conflict Resolution

What we finally seek is the institutionalisation of conflict resolution. In industrial and social life, the non-judicial resolution of conflict has been functionalised; industrial courts of enquiry, business firms that undertake enquiries into industrial conflicts, family guidance councils, are examples. Techniques are still primitive, but the experience has led to new insights into the nature of conflict and to improved techniques. International functionalism has developed in many areas in which States find they need to co-operate: they are confined to the economic and non-political areas. There seems to be no reason why procedures of conflict-resolution should not be systematised and institutionalised in international relations as in social relations, especially if they can be devised so as not to involve political negotiations at least until the basis of settlement is suggested by the process. Functional organization for the settlement of disputes is the logical bridge between traditional functionalism and the area of power politics. The United Nations provides opportunities for debate, for obtaining world consensus, and for certain enforcements or sanctions; a functional organization designed to determine procedures of conflict resolution, and to provide facilities for empirical enquiry and verification as required by the parties themselves, is probably now within the scope of contemporary knowledge. The United Nations cannot impose upon parties to a dispute an obligation to negotiate; but it can offer facilities to parties, and where it is supplying peace-keeping forces it can require co-operation in the resolution of conflict with an appropriate private or official functional agency.

J. W. Burton